We examine the effects of fraud committed by mutual fund managers taking into account the dual responsibilities managers have for their employer firm and investors. We find scandal funds to underperform by 45 basis points while other funds that are affiliated to family linked to scandal to underperform by a larger magnitude of 74 basis points in annualized terms. Fraud is punished by reduced fund inflows to affected funds. Underperformance and money outflows are attributed to timing scandals, higher monetary fines, regulatory actions initiated by SEC, and the involvement of more than one regulatory body. Further tests show that scandal funds are more likely to be engaged in net selling in the aftermath of the scandal possibly to meet redemptions.
Introduction
Financial misconduct or fraud has consequences for both the firm and its customers. In other words, the manager of a company alleged to have committed fraud needs to react to the incident mindful of consequences for shareholders, the product market and her own career concerns. In the literature this multifaceted problem is generally not acknowledged. The penalties for financial misconduct have been separately estimated in terms of stock price losses (e.g. Karpoff and Lott 1993) ; regulatory penalties (e.g. Karpoff, Lee, and Martin 2008) ; product market reputational damages (e.g. Johnson, Xie, and Yi 2014); and loss of corporate control and managerial reputation (Humphery-Jenner 2012) . Similarly, in the mutual fund literature several previous papers have addressed the related question of penalties to mutual fund financial misconduct and fraud, finding performance declines and significant investor redemptions.
1 By pursuing a single line of inquiry at a time, that a corporate manager dealing with fraud serves multiple masters is virtually not acknowledged in the growing literature on financial fraud. In this paper, we examine the performance and flows consequences of alleged financial misconduct, which we refer to as the "external reaction", alongside the internal response of the firm to the fraud (the "internal reaction").
The mutual fund industry is particularly well suited for analyzing how an agent with a "two masters" problem reacts to allegations of fraud. 2 First, the financial press produces volumes of accounts of financial misconduct and fraud by mutual funds and their portfolio managers. In 2012, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reported 147 such allegations against investment advisers, one short of the previous year's record. 3 Zitzewitz (2006) documents that at the height of the late trading scandal, market timing by favored investors in some mutual funds cost long-term investors around $400 million per year from 1998 to 2003. 4 Thus, one gets an impression that both investors and fund companies should pay a great deal of attention to allegations of fraud by individuals and firms that manage their money.
Second, in the mutual fund setting, both the external and internal reactions are measurable. To estimate external penalties, we follow the standard in the literature to estimate performance and money flows following fraud allegations. We also ask the following questions in order to examine the internal actions of fund companies in response to fraud. How do the firms manage their portfolio holdings in response to predictable money outflows? Do fund managers engage in or resist asset fire sales (Coval and Stafford 2007) ? Do fund companies change their fee structures to protect their firms against redemptions in the aftermath of the fraud allegations?
Third, the mutual fund industry allows us to bring to the data two distinct and competing predictions that challenge us to take a more comprehensive approach to investigating penalties to mutual fund fraud. Fund companies' internal responses will likely be conditioned on the consequences of the fraud on investors. Intuitively, while some instances of mutual fund fraud are clearly detrimental to investors, there are others that are ostensibly designed to boost the fund manager's performance, and may benefit investors. In the first case, theory suggests, on the basis of the economics of choice (Becker 1968) , that managers may commit fraud if they perceive net benefits from such acts, and that employing such individuals may benefit the firm's owners (Posner 1986; Tibbs, Harrell and Shrieves 2011) . In the mutual fund context, it is possible that some types of fraud may benefit the fund. An example is the case of a portfolio manager who engages in profitable insider trading, in which case one would expect to see performance increases. We investigate this motive in the mutual fund literature by separating our 4 Market timing is the practice of actively buying and selling fund shares to exploit inefficiencies in mutual fund pricing in the hope of making short-term profits. Similarly, late trading refers to the practice of buying or selling mutual fund shares, predominantly in international funds, after the 4:00 p.m. close of trade when the net asset value of a fund is calculated to capitalize on market events that occur after the fund has been priced. Zitzewitz (2006) finds evidence of a strong correlation between mutual fund flows and market movements after 4:00 p.m. in many mutual fund families, suggesting that late trading was widespread.
empirical analysis according to types of fraud. We conjecture that market timing and disclosure related misconduct hurt investors and show up in poor performance, whereas other types of fraud may benefit investors by way of improved returns.
In the second case, borrowing from the economics and corporate finance literatures, fraud may affect the firm's (or fund company's) contracting with its customers (investors) (Klein and Leffler 1981) , resulting in a "customer reputational sanction" (Johnson, Xie and Yi 2014) . In the mutual fund context, we investigate whether investor punish scandal funds by withdrawing their capital in the aftermath of the scandal. We also test whether fund companies engage in net selling in order to meet redemptions and reduce mutual fund fees in an attempt to re-attract investors.
Our main findings are in line with the view that when studying the implications of fraud on a firm and its product market, we should cover both external and internal reactions. We find scandal funds to underperform by 45 basis points while other funds that are affiliated to family linked to scandal to underperform by a larger magnitude of 74 basis points in annualized terms.
On further analysis, we find that mutual funds' post scandal underperformance is aligned with severity of the fraud. Underperformance is greater for timing scandals, financial misconduct that attracts higher monetary fines, regulatory actions initiated by the SEC, and the involvement of two or more regulatory bodies. In relation to the effect of scandals on money flows, we observe investors punish scandal funds in the aftermath of a scandal in the first three and six months horizons. Investors appear to have forgiven affected funds by the third and fourth quarter following the scandal. Similar to our performance analysis, our further tests show that money outflows are positively associated with the severity of the fraud.
What are the characteristics of the internal reaction to mutual fund scandals? We find scandal funds to engage in net selling since the aftermath of the scandal over three, six, nine, and twelve months horizons. As for the other funds that belong to the family of scandal fund, we find that the net selling is not immediate and only takes place in the third and fourth quarters.
We also find evidence that scandal funds and other funds in the family implicated of scandal to significantly reduce expenditure on marketing and distribution costs, which suggests fund families attempt to ameliorate the fallout from scandals by withdrawing affected funds from the limelight. Altogether, our findings vindicate our suspicion that fund managers react to scandals in line with the dilemma of their position as servants to two masters -investors and fund companies.
Some of the patterns we report with regards to performance and money flows are reported in papers such as Houge and Wellman (2005) and Choi and Kahan (2007) . However, our study, by pursuing new questions on the internal reaction to scandals, is more comprehensive. Further, almost all the previous studies are based on what has come to be referred to as "the mutual fund scandal" involving late trading in the early 2000s, and virtually all are based on samples of fraud allegations gathered from the press, specifically the Wall Street
Journal. The improvement on the literature that our paper makes is to target every instance of fraud reported by mutual funds to U.S. regulators. We take advantage of the mandatory disclosures filed by mutual fund companies with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to identify funds that are affected by scandals in the entire U.S. mutual fund industry. Thus, we cover all types of fraud, using a sample free from selection and survivorship biases.
Our paper is related to studies of the impact of a firm's misconduct on subsequent firm performance, which proxies for reputational losses. Karpoff and Lott (1993) find that firm value losses in the wake of a criminal prosecution for fraud extends beyond the penalties imposed by the court ruling as a result of losses to firm reputation. They argue that reputational losses take the form of either reduced sales or higher contracting costs. Furthermore, Alexander (1999) finds that losses to shareholder wealth are most severe when related parties such as customer groups were the ones affected by the fraud. Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008) study 585 cases of financial fraud pursued by the SEC, and estimate that reputational losses resulting from fraud are in the order of 7.5 times greater than the sum of all legal penalties imposed on the firm. Similarly, Fich and Shivdasani (2007) use an event study methodology to measure the market reaction to announcements of fraud lawsuits, and find a 5.95 percent drop in two-day abnormal stock returns. The common attribute of these papers is that they trace the effects corporate financial misconduct disclosures to a single, external effect. The paper that is closest to ours in having an internal and external focus is Humphery-Jenner (2012) , that investigates the effects of securities class actions (SCAs) on companies and finds that SCAs are associated with subsequent "disciplinary takeovers, CEO turnover and pay-cuts, and harm to CEOs' future job-prospects".
Our mutual fund setting enables us to explore business unit level operational effects in ways that are not possible in a corporate context. As such, the results of this study are of relevance to regulators and investors as they add internal dimensions of the effects of corporate fraud that might not be as salient as the external effects these parties are usually exposed to in the literature.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the steps involved in developing a useable dataset to test our hypotheses. Section 3 presents the methodology used to test our hypotheses. Section 4 reports our empirical findings and section 5 concludes.
Data and Descriptive Statistics

Mutual Fund Scandals Data
To construct our sample of mutual fund scandals, we begin by extracting the complete list of investment advisers from the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database under the variable heading adv_name. We then search for individual investment advisers by name in the SEC's Investment Adviser Public Disclosure (IAPD) database. 5 This Internet database is available to the public and allows individuals to obtain an adviser's Form ADV, the uniform form investment advisers lodge to register with both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and state regulatory authorities. At registration, and in subsequent annual updates, the investment adviser uses the 35-page document to provide an outline of the investment adviser's business activities, remuneration, affiliations and past legal and regulatory problems. The comprehensive document is designed to inform investors on the potential risks that they face when investing with a particular investment adviser, and consequently it should become an integral part of the investment decision process. Additionally, the filings contain Disclosure
Reporting Pages (DRPs) in which fund companies provide complete histories of regulatory and legal violations perpetrated by their employees. These DRPs provide us with all the relevant information about a particular misconduct event, including when charges were made, which regulatory body initiated the action, and details of the nature and outcome (e.g. penalties) of the charges.
We use the CRSP database as our starting point for identifying investment advisers, of which mutual fund families are a large part. As the CRSP database contains non-surviving funds (and their adviser companies) we can collect the names of advisers that are no longer in operation. The IAPD database allows us to obtain the last Form ADV filing made by extinct advisers. Using these two features, we are able to access all mutual fund fraud cases and to retain observations where adviser closures have occurred since the scandal event. Thus, our sample construction method is free of selection and survivorship biases.
After extracting the data, this process leaves us with a total of 1,678 regulatory and legal violations. As investment advisers may potentially be involved in many lines of business, we restrict the data to include observations where the principal products involved are mutual funds, which results in 216 violations. We further require that these regulatory events be finalized, which further reduces the dataset to 196 violations. 6 After imposing these restrictions, we then proceed to determine the individual funds that were involved in the regulatory violation. The narrative that accompanies a particular regulatory action in the investment adviser's DRP is substantially condensed and therefore in many cases the names of individual funds were not disclosed. To overcome this problem, we perform an Internet search using the docket number of the case provided in the DRP to obtain the complete details of the administrative proceeding.
In our sample, the SEC was primarily responsible for instigating regulatory actions against mutual funds and they maintain timely and complete information on their regulatory actions. For larger and more severe cases of regulatory wrongdoing, a disgorgement may be imposed upon the investment adviser, whereby a fair fund is created and the disgorgement money is then redistributed to harmed investors. In these cases, we look at the distribution plan for funds that were involved in a particular regulatory violation. 
Mutual Fund Characteristics
From the CRSP database we obtain a range of mutual fund characteristics including total net assets (TNA), returns, inception dates, investment objectives, cash holdings, fund fees (such as expense ratios, management fees, and 12b-1 fees), and turnover ratios. We initially collect all available monthly fund returns and TNA from CRSP and merge on remaining fund characteristics that are reported on a quarterly basis. Because the regulatory violations within our mutual fund scandals data can potentially fall in any month of the year, we fill fund summary observations backwards to the preceding quarter. For example, the months of January and February will assume the fund summary variables as at March of that same year. This implicitly assumes that mutual fund characteristics, such as expense ratios, do not vary considerably between quarters. We then remove observations that have missing portfolio identifiers (crsp_portno) and mutual fund family identifiers (mgmt_cd).
In the CRSP database, mutual funds are reported at the share class level, such as "A", "B", "C" or "Institutional". Different share classes of the same fund may offer investors differences in front-end loads, rear-end loads and 12b-1 fees. We then apply two additional criteria to eliminate two known potential biases associated with the CRSP database. First, following Elton, Gruber and Blake (2001), we delete funds that are less than $15 million in size to avoid omission bias. Omission bias arises as a result of small funds having returns provided at either quarterly or annual frequencies as opposed to monthly, which causes an understatement in mutual fund mergers and exits and ultimately produces a bias similar to survivorship bias. Second, we remove observations that occur before the date when the fund was first offered (first_offer_dt) to correct for incubation bias. Mutual fund incubation is a strategy followed by some mutual fund families, where multiple new funds are created with limited capital, while they remain closed to the public throughout an assessment period. Evans (2010) finds that incubated funds are able to significantly outperform non-incubated funds.
Finally, we winsorize all variables at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles to remove the effects of outliers.
We also collect data on mutual fund holdings for our entire sample period from the CRSP database. From 2001 onwards, CRSP provides data on equity mutual fund holdings at quarterly frequencies. The data include the name and identifier of individual securities that a fund owns, the number of units that are held, as well as the market prices of the securities. We aggregate fund holdings at each quarter, which provides us with the total value of invested securities (portfolio value).
In addition to mutual fund characteristics, we also construct a Herfindahl Index on a monthly basis to account for the level of competitiveness in the mutual fund industry that may potentially impact on mutual fund returns and flows. To construct this variable, we calculate the size of the mutual fund industry in each month by aggregating the total net assets of all mutual fund families within our mutual fund sample. We then determine the weight of each mutual fund family in the industry by dividing the family size by industry size. These weights are then squared and sorted in the order of largest to smallest. The top 50 largest mutual fund families in the industry are retained and we then sum the squared industry weighting for each of these mutual fund families. More formally, we can represent the Herfindahl Index as:
( 1) where , 2 represents the squared industry weighting for mutual fund family i at a given month, t.
A higher Herfindahl Index indicates that there a fewer and larger mutual fund families dominating the industry.
Descriptive Statistics of Scandal and Non-Scandal Funds
In Table 2 , we provide a correlation matrix for all continuous control variables. The condition index of the matrix is 2.21, which is low enough to show that there is no multicollinearity.
<< Insert Table 2 here >>
We report the summary statistics of our mutual fund data in Table 3 . Panel A shows summary statistics for scandal funds only, while Panel B shows summary statistics for all other funds. In Panel C, we perform a difference-in-means test to determine if there are significant differences between funds involved in scandals and their non-scandal counterparts. We compare the means of both groups across all mutual fund characteristics and performance measures.
Scandal funds are significantly bigger in size and belong to larger fund families than non-scandal funds. The average size of a scandal fund is $1,938 million and belongs to a family with total net assets of $187,928 million. This is in contrast to an average fund size of $991 million for nonscandal funds that belong to a family with total net assets averaging $85,165 million. Scandal funds also have higher expense ratios. The expenses are made up of higher management fees, 12b-1 fees, and non-12b-1 fees. Scandal funds have higher turnover ratios of 97% in comparison to 84% for non-scandal funds. Interestingly, on average, scandal funds have cash holdings of around 1.2% lower than their non-scandal counterparts possibly to meet redemptions. Finally, consistent with our expectations, we find scandal funds to experience lower level of fund flows and performance. We subject our preliminary findings to more rigorous tests below.
<<Insert Table 3 here>> 3. Methodology
The Effect of a Scandal on Fund Performance
Previous studies such as Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010) 
where ℎ , : + is the fund's alpha calculated based on Carhart four-factor model augmented with APB factor over three, six, nine, and twelve months future horizons. The main explanatory variables are Scandal Fund which denotes a fund involved in a scandal at time t and Scandal Family which identifies whether the fund belongs to a family hosting a scandal fund at time t.
We control for a range of mutual fund characteristics that are likely to have an impact on future fund performance. Fund Size is included to control for the difficulty in successfully investing large pools of funds. Chen et al. (2004) document that the performance of equity funds erodes as fund size increases due to diseconomies of scale. We include Family Size as funds that 9 See Hunter et al. (2014) for more detailed explanations on the augmented models.
belong to larger families should be able to achieve greater economies of scale, such as lower transaction costs, and other benefits associated with market power which in turn should help to augment returns. 10 We take the natural logarithm of fund and family size to account for nonlinearity in the relationship. Turnover Ratio is included to control for the trading frequency of a particular manager. Turnover Ratio measures the percentage of fund assets that are replaced over a certain period, where a higher turnover ratio indicates more aggressive buying and selling. Barber and Odean (2000) find that higher turnover ratios can lead to underperformance due to additional transaction costs. We also control for a fund's Expense Ratio, which compensates the fund for operational costs. Carhart (1997) documents that fund expenses are detrimental to performance. Cash is included to control for the level of liquidity in the funds to meet investors' redemption. The variable Alpha accounts for performance predictability. We include Fund Flow variable to account for the difficulty in finding adequate investments for new money. Coval and Stafford (2007) find that fund managers that are faced with large inflows tend to hastily invest the money into securities that they already hold which creates price pressure and can negatively affect performance. Finally, we incorporate the Herfindahl Index to account for competition in the mutual fund industry.
The Effect of a Scandal on Money Flows
We follow Sirri and Tufano (1998) 
10 Collins and Mack (1997) estimate that the optimal size for a mutual fund complex is between $20 billion and $40 billion.
To examine the effect of a scandal on money flows, we estimate the following model: We control for a range of non-performance related variables that are likely to have an impact on future fund flows and their sensitivity to performance. Following Huang, Wei, and
Yan (2007), we include fund size which is measured as the natural logarithm of fund's total net assets, the natural logarithm of fund age and its interaction with performance, total risk of a fund as measured by the standard deviation of returns over the performance estimation period, and expense ratios.
The Effect of a Scandal on Net Selling Activities
Next, to investigate the effect that a scandal has on the probability of fund engaging in net selling, we estimate the following model: 
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, and
, : + is a binary variable equal to one if the portfolio value at k quarters ahead is less than the current portfolio value at time t and zero otherwise. The main explanatory variables are
Scandal Fund and Scandal Family that are used to denote a fund involved in a scandal fund, or belongs to the family of a scandal fund in respective order.
We include standard mutual fund characteristics from our previous regressions as control variables. More importantly, we include the percentage of fund assets that are held as cash (Cash) to control for a fund's ability to meet investor redemptions. Higher cash holdings should alleviate the need for a fund to sell securities to meet investor withdrawals. We include a full set of monthly dummy variables to control for time fixed effects that should account for the possibility that net selling was identified as a result of declining market values.
The Effect of a Scandal on Fund Fees
Finally, to investigate the effect that a scandal has on the probability of a fee change, we estimate the following model: where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, and , : + is a binary variable equal to one if a particular mutual fund fee at k quarters ahead is less than the fee at time t and zero otherwise. The main explanatory variables are Scandal Fund and Scandal Family that are used to denote a fund involved in a scandal fund, or belongs to the family of a scandal fund in respective order.
In addition, we control for standard mutual fund characteristics that are likely to affect the decision of the fund or family to lower its fees at some future date. We include Fund Age to control for the experience of the fund. Ferris and Chance (1987) suggest that mutual funds face a learning curve and therefore older funds with more experience are able to achieve greater operational efficiency. We include Fund Size to control for economies of scale in managing a larger pool of funds. Because the majority of fund expenses are fixed costs, funds that have more assets are able to charge proportionately lower fees (Latzko (1999) ). Similarly we include Family
Size as another measure of scale which may also contribute benefits that arise from economies of scale. We take the natural logarithm of fund and family to account for a non-linear relationship.
Finally, we include Alpha and Fund Flow to account for fund performance and money flows.
Better performance and larger money inflows should allow the fund to lower its fees due to the incremental fee revenue that is generated.
Empirical Results
The Effect of a Scandal on Fund Performance
In this section, we provide results for multivariate regression models in which we examine the impact of a scandal on a fund's subsequent performance. In Table 4 that while scandal funds suffer upon the discovery of regulatory violations, there appears to be negative spillover effects to other funds in the same family in the form of lower performance.
Findings on the control variables are explained as follow. First, we find Fund Size to be positive and statistically significant at 1% level. In contrast to Chen et al. (2004) , we find the performance of equity funds does not suffer as fund size increases. Such findings suggest that funds are able to successfully investing larger pool of funds which is in support of economies of scale argument. Second, we find Expense Ratio and Turnover Ratio have a negative impact on fund performance across four regression models. This is consistent with our earlier expectations that higher expenses and turnover activities are detrimental to fund performance (see Carhart (1997) and Barber and Odean (2000) ). Table 4 here >>
<< Insert
Does the Scandal Type Matter for Fund Performance?
We have shown that scandals result in a deterioration of fund performance in the aftermath of a scandal. In this section, we examine which type of scandal has the largest effect on performance. Following the literature, we categorize each mutual fund scandal in our sample into one of three categories: market timing, disclosure, and "other" scandals. Dummy variables were used to indicate the particular scandal type. This methodology is similar to Choi and Kahn (2007) in which they assess the severity of fund flows based on the scandal type.
The market timing scandal dummy (Timing Scandal) denotes only scandals in which the mutual fund was alleged to have allowed market timing in its fund to occur We display the post scandal performance of mutual funds by scandal type in Table 5 .
Our variables of interest are the interaction variables between Scandal Fund and Scandal Family variables and Timing, Disclosure and Other Scandal dummy. As reported in model (1)- (4) in Table 5, we find the underperformance of scandal funds and funds belonging to fund families linked to scandal is largely driven by timing scandal. It is important to note that by restricting the analysis to include only timing scandal, we observe a more severe underperformance in the magnitude of 82 basis points for scandal funds and 131 basis points for funds affiliated to fund families connected to scandal. Such findings are statistically significant at 1% level. The findings are unsurprising considering the severity of timing scandal in comparison to other types of scandal.
Our findings are further by Choi and Kahan (2007) who find investors to penalize funds involved in timing and disclosure scandals. We however do not find evidence of underperformance for disclosure and other scandal. Table 5 here >>
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Severity of Mutual Fund Scandals and Fund Performance
Monetary Penalty
Mutual fund scandals typically result in monetary penalties that are intended to reflect the severity of the misconduct. Rationally, we would expect investor responses to be more severe for scandals that were penalized with heavy monetary fines, given the apparent impact and publicity of such a scandal. Using the monetary penalty of the litigation as a proxy for scandal severity, we create two additional variables which are Large Fine and Small Fine. Large (Small) Fine is a binary variable equal to one if the monetary penalty is above (below) the median penalty for all scandals that occurred in any given year. We construct these variables by scandal year as nominal penalties tend to increase in size over time. Therefore, if we were to consider the median penalty across our entire sample, the distribution of large fines would be skewed towards the most recent observations. In Panel A of Table 6 , consistent with our earlier expectation, we find scandal funds with higher monetary fines are associated with underperformance of 67 basis points in the year following the initiation of the scandal. Funds belonging to fund families linked to scandal underperform by 101 basis points in the following year. Clearly, the market penalty for mutual fund scandals will act as deterrent for funds to carry any form of financial misconducts. Such findings are not observed for scandal funds that attract lower monetary fines.
Regulatory Bodies
We previously argued that the continued occurrence of mutual fund scandals suggests that federal laws and regulations have not been entirely effective in deterring mutual fund scandals. This view is supported by Agrawal and Chadha (2005) who note that SEC is more likely to pursue the most severe and high profile cases of financial fraud as the SEC is constrained by resources in pursuing all cases. Therefore the level of fraud is likely to be much higher than what the public are aware of. In addition, a recent study by Dyck, Morse and Zingales (2010) finds that the SEC was responsible for detecting only 7% of corporate fraud cases, while other regulatory agencies were responsible for detecting 14% of the fraud cases.
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They argue that fraud detection relies on a number of non-traditional overseers such as the media, analysts and employees.
In this section, we seek to uncover whether the SEC is effective in disciplining mutual fund scandals. To do this, we classify scandals based on which regulatory body first initiated the scandal allegation against the investment adviser. We define SEC as a binary variable equal to one if the enforcement action is first undertaken by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
and Non SEC as a binary variable equal to one if the enforcement action is first undertaken by any regulator other than the SEC, such as the New York Attorney General (NYAG), Self
Regulatory Organizations (SRO), state regulators, or class actions. In Panel B of Table 6 , we find that SEC interventions are more effective in disciplining mutual funds, indicated by the negative performance of scandal funds in the order of 116 basis points in the year following the litigation of the scandal. We find similar findings for funds affiliated to fund families connected to scandal with underperformance in the order of 99 basis points. For scandals that were pursued by non-SEC regulatory bodies, we do not observe the performance of scandal funds to be significantly affected in comparison to non-scandal funds.
Number of Regulatory Interventions
We conjecture that the severity of a scandal can be signaled by the number of regulatory bodies that pursue an investment adviser for the wrongdoing. We find this regulatory behavior to be common within our data, with the observation of additional regulators following an initial allegation. This raises the question of whether more regulatory involvement equates to better disciplining of scandal funds. To address this question, we separate scandal events into single versus multiple interventions. Single Intervention is a binary variable equal to one if only one regulatory body pursues a scandal and Multiple Intervention is a binary variable equal to one if two or more regulatory bodies pursue a scandal. In Panel C of Table 6 , we show that multiple interventions results in negative performance of 73 basis points in the following year for scandal funds and 122 basis points for funds belonging to fund families implicated in scandal. This suggests the effectiveness of intervention on mutual fund scandals when there are two or more regulators who undertake enforcement actions.
<<Insert Table 6 here>>
The Effect of a Scandal on Money Flows
Next, we consider the impact of scandal on the fund flows of affected funds and other funds within the same family. In Table 7 , we show our results on the impact of scandals on fund's subsequent flows. The key explanatory variables of interest are Scandal Fund and Scandal
Family. Similar to our regression analysis of future performance, we use fund flows in the subsequent three, six, nine, and twelve months horizons as the dependent variable.
In model (1) and (2) of Table 7 , consistent with Choi and Kahan (2007), we observe investors punish scandal funds in the aftermath of a scandal in the first three and six months horizons. The effect of the scandal on fund flows is most pronounced in model (2). Here, scandal funds had fund flows that were 2.61% lower than non-scandal funds. 14 If we consider an average scandal fund that has $1,993 million in total net assets at the time of the scandal, this effect would correspond to around $52 million worth of fund outflows. By the third and fourth quarter following the scandal, investors appear to have forgiven the fund for the scandal as is evident from the statistically insignificant coefficient estimates. Importantly, from these results we observe that a reduction in fund flows precedes the underperformance previously examined in Table 4 . This suggests the possibility that fund performance is partly affected by a fire sale of assets to meet investor withdrawals. We however do not find any evidence of money outflows on funds belonging to fund families linked to scandal.
The findings of our control variables shown in Table 7 Table 7 here >> Finally, similar to our performance analysis, we re-examine the effect of scandals on future money flows based on scandal types and the severity of mutual fund scandals. Consistent with our conjecture, in unreported results for the sake of brevity, we find money outflows to be associated with timing scandals, and scandals with high monetary fines, regulatory actions initiated by SEC, and the involvement of more than one regulatory body.
<< Insert
14 Choi and Kahan (2007) find that the scandal funds have the lowest flows relative to non-scandal funds in the third month following the scandal. In this month scandal funds had 2.8% lower fund flows than non-scandal funds. Also, scandals had the greatest impact on fund flows in months 3 to 5 after the scandal, after which the coefficient lowered in magnitude but remained negative and significant.
Does Selling Accompany the Deterioration of Performance?
So far we have concentrated on the external reaction to financial misconduct disclosures.
Next we look at the internal reaction. We conjecture that scandal funds may have to resort to fire selling of fund assets to meet investor redemptions, causing performance to suffer. To partially test this conjecture, we model the probability of a fund engaging in net selling. We define net selling to occur when the future market value of invested securities is less than the current market value of invested securities. A lower market value would result from either a decline in security prices, or when a fund is selling more securities than it is buying. A fund would have to sell securities if redemptions exceed the current cash holdings of the fund.
In Table 8 , we use a probit model to estimate the probability that a scandal fund is engaging in net selling. Our variable of interest is Scandal Fund and Scandal Family. We find scandal funds to engage in net selling since the aftermath of the scandal over three, six, nine, and twelve months horizons with findings statistically significant at 1% level. As for the other funds that belong to the family of scandal fund, we find that the net selling is not immediate and only takes place in the third and fourth quarters. Cash is negatively related to net selling as funds with greater cash holdings are able to meet investor redemptions more easily. Our findings are robust to the inclusion of family and time fixed effects.
<<Insert Table 8 here>>
The Effect of a Scandal on Fund Fees
We next model the internal effect that a scandal has on the probability of a fee change.
Previous studies have shown that the level of fees is influential on performance and flows (see Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) and Carhart (1997) ) and therefore a fund and associated family funds may modify their fee structures to rectify the damage of the scandal. Since the level of fees incurs a trade-off, where lower fees increase fund flows yet diminish marginal fee revenue, it is unclear as to which direction a scandal or family fund may modify its fees. We model a fee downgrade using a binary variable to indicate if a fee at some future point in time after the scandal is lower than the current fee as our dependent variable. We also consider the non-12b-1 fee and 12b-1 fee separately because these fees serve different purposes. The non-12b-1 fee is compensation for the fund's investment expertise while the 12b-1 fee is a cost paid by a fund to market and distributes fund shares through broker dealers.
We report results of these regressions in Table 9 . In models (1)- (4), focusing on non12b-1 fee, we find weak or no evidence to suggest that scandal funds reduce non-12b-1 fee.
Instead, we find other funds in the family implicated of scandal to downgrade non-12b-1 fee possibly in their attempt to retain investors in the funds. In model (5)- (8) we investigate the probability of a reduction in 12b-1 fees. We find that the Scandal Fund and Scandal Family variables have a positive and significant influence on the probability of reductions in 12b-1 fees, and the effects are significant at 1% level across three, six, nine, and twelve months horizons.
These results suggest that in response to a fraud allegation, scandal funds and other funds in the family are more likely to reduce marketing expenditure on such funds, possibly to remove them from the lime-light and to ameliorate the family-wide effects of the scandal.
Other results are as follows. Fund Age and Family Size have a positive relation to a fee downgrades across the regression models. This is consistent with our expectations. Older funds have more operational knowledge to achieve efficiency, while funds of larger families are able to gain economies of scale from being part of larger fund complexes. Moreover, older funds and funds from large families do not have to spend as much on marketing and distribution costs (i.e.
12b-1 fees) because of their higher visibility. Our findings are robust to the inclusion of family and time fixed effects.
<<Insert Table 9 here>>
Conclusion
Fund managers face the dilemma of serving "two masters", raising the question of how they behave in the aftermath of the disclosure of fraud. We identify a sample of mutual fund scandals that occur throughout a six-year period between 2002 and 2010. Taken together, our findings vindicate our conjecture that to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the effects of fraud on mutual funds, it is necessary to look at both external and internal responses. we examine the impact of a scandal on fund flows to examine whether the scandal acts as a contagion that spreads to other funds within the same family. We find investors punish scandal funds by withdrawing capital in the aftermath of a scandal over the first three and six months horizons. Unlike Choi and Kahan (2007) , We do not however find any evidence of money outflows on funds belonging to fund families linked to scandal.
We further examine the internal responses of a scandal fund or its family to rectify the caused damage. We hypothesize that performance may be affected by the fire sales of invested assets to meet investor withdrawals. Our analysis shows that scandal funds were on average more likely to be engaged in net selling. We also model the probability that a scandal fund or one of its affiliated family funds downgrades its fees following the scandal. We find other funds in the family implicated of scandal to be more likely to downgrade their non-12b-1 fee possibly in their efforts to re-attract investors. Interestingly, we also find scandal funds and other funds in the same family to reduce their expenditure on marketing and distribution costs (12b-1 fees).
This suggests that mutual fund families strategically reduce their 12b-1 fees in their efforts to take themselves out of the limelight of the scandal.
We identify several avenues stemming from our paper to potentially be explored in later research. First, subsequent research could focus on the internal responses undertaken by a mutual fund family in response to the scandal. Qian (2011) establishes that the external governance mechanism of investors withdrawing their assets is effective in deterring scandals when fund flow sensitivity is the highest. However, we do not know if manager turnover is related to mutual fund scandals. Second, further efforts can be aimed at determining if managers of scandal funds significantly adjust the riskiness of their portfolio holdings in an effort to return the performance to its prior state. Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) both document that funds that appear to be mid-year's losers increase the riskiness of the fund in the second half in their efforts to increase performance. Third, focus could be dedicated to discovering if scandals are related to mutual fund exits. Zhao (2005) finds that mutual fund exits, either through liquidation or merging, is negatively related to fund flows and performance.
Thus, having established in this paper that scandals result in reduced performance and flows, we would expect that scandal funds are more likely to be closed by the family. This table displays the correlation between continuous independent variables. Log(Age) is the natural logarithm of the fund's age in years, where age is calculated as the difference between the data date and the date that the fund first appeared in the CRSP mutual fund database. Log(Fund Size) is the natural logarithm of the fund's total net assets in millions of dollars. Log(Family Size) is the natural logarithm of the combined total net assets of all funds managed by a fund family in millions of dollars. Expense Ratio is the percentage of fund assets charged by the fund on an annual basis to compensate for operating costs, and includes the management fee and 12b-1 fees. Turnover Ratio measures the percentage of fund assets that are renewed, and is calculated as the minimum of sales and purchases divided by the average yearly fund size. Cash is the percentage of fund assets that are held as cash.
Herfindahl Index is a measure of industry concentration. OAF is the objective adjusted flow and is calculated as the monthly percentage fund flow net of the median percentage flow of all funds following the same strategy. OAR is the objective adjusted return, and is calculated as the monthly return net of the median return of all funds following the same strategy.
Log ( In Panel C, a difference in means test is performed between scandal funds and non-scandal funds. Fund Size is the total net assets of the fund in millions of dollars. Family Size is the combined total net assets of all funds within a particular mutual fund family in millions of dollars. Fund Age is the age of the fund in years calculated as the difference between a particular date and the date that the fund first appeared in the CRSP mutual fund database. Expense Ratio is the percentage of fund assets charged by the fund on an annual basis to compensate for operating costs, and includes the management fee and 12b-1 fees. Management Fee is the cost for the manager's expertise, and is presented as a percentage of fund assets. Actual 12b-1 is the cost paid by the fund for marketing and distribution, and is presented as a percentage of fund assets. Turnover Ratio measures the percentage of fund assets that are renewed, and is calculated as the minimum of sales and purchases divided by the average yearly fund size. Cash is the percentage of fund assets held as cash. OAF is the objective adjusted flow and is calculated as the monthly percentage fund flow net of the median percentage flow of all funds following the same strategy. OAR is the objective adjusted return, and is calculated as the monthly return net of the median return of all funds following the same strategy. CAPM, 3-Factor and 4-Factor alphas are the intercept coefficients retained from performing 36-month rolling regressions on the CAPM, three-factor and four-factor risk adjusted models respectively. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. This table shows probit regression results of the effect of a scandal on the probability of a fee downgrade. All models were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the expense ratio at 6 and 12 months after the scandal is less than the current expense ratio in respective order. In model (3) and (4), the dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the management fee at 6 and 12 months after the scandal is less than the current management fee in respective order. In model (5) and (6), the dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 12b-1 fee at 6 and 12 months after the scandal is less than the current 12b-1 fee in respective order. Scandal Fund is a binary variable that is equal to one if a fund was involved in a scandal at time t and zero otherwise. Scandal Family is a binary variable equal to one if the fund belongs to a family of a scandal fund at time t and zero otherwise. Log(Fund Age) is the natural logarithm of the fund's age in years. Log(Fund Size) is the natural logarithm of the fund's total net assets. Log(Family Size) is the natural logarithm of the combined total net assets of all funds that share the same family identifier. Turnover Ratio measures the percentage of fund assets that are renewed, and is calculated as the minimum of sales and purchases divided by the average yearly fund size. Cash is the percentage of fund assets held as cash. OAR is the objective adjusted return, and is calculated as the monthly return net of the median return of all funds following the same strategy. OAF is the percentage fund flow net of the median percentage flow of all funds following the same strategy. Herfindahl Index is a measure of industry concentration. Family and time fixed effects are included in each regression and standard errors are clustered at fund level and reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
